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Location and the Design of Executives’ Compensation in China 
Abstract： 
This article tries to find the effect of a firm’s location on executives’ compensation 
in China, especially for non-state-owned listed enterprises. Based on the data from 
2013-2017, I find that there are significant gaps between executives’ remuneration of 
companies in smaller cities and that of companies in mega cities. Companies in mega 
cities pay 33.5% more in equity and 28.4% more in cash to their top managers. After 
controlling for the cost of living, the gaps are narrowed. Executives in smaller cities 
earn only 3.7% less in equity compensation and 3.8% more in cash compensation. I 
also find that top managers in firms in smaller cities have lower pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. However, the influence of firms’ location on 
equity-compensation-for-performance sensitivity is insignificant. This result may 
have some implications for the shareholders of companies in smaller cities as they can 
increase the proportion of equity-based compensation to connect their interests and 
executives’ interests better. 
 
Keywords: Executives’ compensation, Pay-for-performance sensitivity, Firm location, 
China 





China has been introducing market reforms since 1978. The tremendous growth of 
the Chinese economy in the past 40 years indicates the great success of the 
reformation. The core principle of this reform is the transition from a planned 
economy to a market one. Private ownership and profit-oriented enterprises were 
revived in this reform after their demise in 1950s in China. Even some 
state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) have started to transform into joint stock companies. 
These companies would follow the principles of the free market rather than the 
government’s instructions to produce and operate. Accordingly, the system will be 
transformed into a modern corporate system. In this case, top managers have more 
discretion in the operations of their companies. They are acting more like their peers 
in Western countries to make decisions on most of the major affairs of their 
organizations. As a result, effective incentives for executives play a more important 
role in corporate governance and become more practical in reforming the Chinese 
market. 
Many Chinese researchers and researchers focusing on the Chinese market have 
realized the significance of executive compensation. They have made some effort to 
explore the factors in determining this compensation and the relationship between 
executives’ pay and firm performance. Many of them prefer to combine executives’ 
compensation with the Chinese market-oriented reform directly. They are more 
willing to compare the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs. Almost none of them 
take geographic influence on corporate governance or compensation into account. 
China has 9.6 million square kilometers of territory that crosses 5,500 kilometers from 
north to south and 5,200 kilometers from east to west. Geography is non-negligible 
when I attempt to probe the compensation system of listed companies located on this 
land. This paper investigates the effect of geographic location on executives’ 
compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity in Chinese listed companies. 
Another deficiency of existing studies regarding Chinese executives’ compensation 
is that almost all of them merely involve cash compensation. Equity compensation, 
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which occupies a large proportion in compensation of Western executives, remains an 
extremely limited concern in China. The function and importance of equity 
compensation has been demonstrated in a large number of articles. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) find that compensation should be designed as an effective incentive 
for senior management to maximize shareholders’ wealth, and that equity-based 
compensation is one of the most important incentives. Murphy (1999) focuses on the 
general motivation of stocks and options in mining and manufacturing industries, 
financial industries, and other industries (including wholesale and retail trade and 
service industries). He also affirms that stock-based compensation, rather than other 
types of compensation, increases pay-for-performance sensitivity. Carpenter (2000) 
also substantiates the incentive effect of stock options. Compensation packages 
containing out-of-money options will encourage managers to decrease their risk 
aversion and compensation packages containing in-the-money options will increase 
this risk aversion. Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) find that for every $1 value 
stock option granted to executives, operating income will increase by $3.71. Equity 
compensation is a significant part of executive pay and the system of incentives for 
executives, and it deserves more in-depth studies. However, until recently, scholars 
are less likely to have access to the statistical data of Chinese executives’ equity 
compensation. I intend to add this element to my study to fill the gap in the research 
on the Chinese market. 
Many studies have been undertaken regarding the relevance of employees’ wages 
and geographic impacts. Most of this research has proved the positive effect of urban 
agglomeration on people’s wages or CEOs’ compensation. Urban agglomeration 
improves the workers’ productivity and increases the price for workers’ labor 
(Wheeler 2001; Ciccone 2002; Bacolod, Blum, and Strange 2009; Addario and 
Patacchini 2008). As for more skilled employees, like CEOs, this effect of 
agglomeration is also prominent (Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman 2016). 
Furthermore, both Francis et al. (2016) and Zhang and Chung (2018) have found that 
equity-based compensation in rural areas makes up less of the total compensation 
when compared to their urban counterparts. However, Bhabra and Hossain (2018) 
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confirm that Canadian rural small and medium enterprises pay a higher proportion of 
equity compensation to executives and remunerate their executives almost the same 
after adjusting for the cost of living. Thus, the results of these studies on executive 
compensation and geographic impacts are not fully consistent. U.S. and Canada are 
both countries with vast territories. There is no way to predict that China will be 
similar to either of them. Moreover, the prevailing wisdom that income is 
significantly greater in urban areas than in rural areas even after adjusting for the cost 
of living is only shown to be true in the U.S. and several developed European 
countries including Germany, France, the U.K., and Italy. China is a different case 
considering its previous socialist economic system and unique economic development 
history. The market pricing mechanism for the labor market and equity compensation 
has a very short history in China. Dating back to the beginning of Chinese market 
reforms, the resurrection of private ownership made it possible to apply 
market-oriented management rather than government-oriented integrated management 
to Chinese companies. I find that modern enterprise system that provides companies 
greater discretion to determine executives’ compensation was used in Chinese firms 
for the first time in 1978. On December 19, 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
opened for business and seven months later, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened. 
Listed companies did not appear until that time. Two years later, China Vanke Co. 
became the first company to pay stock options to its executives. The Chinese 
marketization and stock market are so young that it is difficult to conjecture whether 
the differences between rural and urban firms in China will be similar to the 
differences between rural and urban firms in the U.S., European developed countries, 
or Canada. For this reason, the Chinese market is still worthy of additional study 
when numerous papers out of China have focused on the issue. 
In addition to the effect of geography on executive compensation, a large body of 
research has indicated that geography can affect companies and markets in many 
other respects. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that companies’ stock returns co-move 
with that of companies in the same area. Geography is also identified as a pivotal 
element affecting stock liquidity (Loughran and Schultz 2005; Loughran 2008). Rural 
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stocks are much less liquid than urban stocks as rural companies find it hard to draw 
investors’ attention. Likewise, as investors lack information regarding remote 
companies, rural companies adopt seasoned equity offerings much less frequently 
than their urban counterparts. Greater credit risk is found in Taiwan rural firms, and 
companies with high credit risk seek to raise funds in debt markets away from their 
headquarters (Chen 2016). As for investors, their portfolios are imperceptibly changed 
by geographic factors. Investors, whether they are individual investors or institutional 
investors, prefer to pursue local investment targets and earn greater profits from these 
local stocks (Brennan and Cao 1997; Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001; Brown, 
Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner 2004; Stotz 2011; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005; 
Kumar, Page, and Spalt 2013). All of the geographic influences above indicate 
information asymmetry as a factor. Specifically, when investors are physically closer 
to a company, they will obtain better information about the firm. They even can obtain 
confidential information that is not available to more distant investors. This trade 
informational advantage forms the basis of investors’ excess returns and the 
propensity to trade local stocks. In 2010, the Chinese urban population surpassed its 
rural population. Moreover, according to statistics from the Mobdata database, more 
than 27.2% of investors come from China’s nine largest cities (e.g., 45.8% investors 
live in Chinese first-tier cities that include the top 19 cities ranked by China Business 
News). We can infer that Chinese urban firms can diffuse their information faster and 
more widely to investors than rural firms with fewer local investors. Top managers’ 
power can be reinforced by this information asymmetry between urban and rural areas. 
They can utilize this enhanced power to design a compensation package that is more 
beneficial to themselves (John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva 2011). Alternatively, this 
lack of information transparency could damage the supervision of shareholders. Thus, 
I explore the potential differences in the compensation design of executives in smaller 
cities and the compensation design of executives in mega cities and compare the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity of executives in mega cities and those of the smaller 
cities in China. I do not use the regular definition of rural and urban areas as in prior 
papers as China's huge population makes zoning more difficult. In China, in an 
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underdeveloped city, it is still possible to gather millions of people. It is quite different 
from normal rural areas. Therefore, I use mega cities and smaller cities to distinguish 
the two kinds of areas in my study. 
As the background and literature cited above inspire me, I set two major purposes 
in this paper. First, I attempt to examine the differences in the compensation of 
executives in smaller cities to that of executive compensation in mega cities including 
their amount and structure. I also investigate the role that smaller cities play in this 
difference. In addition, I compare the pay-performance sensitivity of companies in 
smaller cities and mega cities and try to narrow the gap between companies in these 
two areas. For meeting these objectives, I develop hypotheses correspondingly. First, I 
believe Chinese executives in mega cities will earn more than their peers in smaller 
cities. Wheeler (2001) finds that urban agglomeration can improve the productivity 
and increase the prices for labor. Francis et al. (2016) indicates that urban CEOs earn 
about 25% more due to urban agglomeration effects. Thus, it is reasonable to 
speculate that executives in mega cities can earn more than executives in smaller 
cities. After adjusting for the cost of living, this disparity should be eliminated. 
However, I am unsure how much of the distinction between the compensation of 
executives in these two areas will be erased. Additionally, executives in smaller cities 
should receive a greater portion of cash compensation that is more stable and less 
risky as they have more power to determine their pay and face weaker supervision 
from shareholders (Francis et al. 2016; Zhang, Chung 2018). When I adjust the data 
by the cost of living index, the reasons above should still hold. Consequently, 
executives in smaller cities should still earn a greater proportion of their compensation 
in the form of cash. Moreover, for the same reasons, I expect that companies in 
smaller cities will have lower pay-performance sensitivity. Since equity compensation 
is usually more dependent on performance, I also expect that equity compensation for 
performance sensitivity will not be influenced by geographic location. Finally, since I 
attribute lower pay-for-performance sensitivity of enterprises in smaller cities to the 
enhanced power of top management and weaker supervision from shareholders, I 
predict that more institutional investors and more members on the board of directors 
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can remedy this issue. 
The empirical findings in the study are listed as follows. (1) Companies in mega 
cities pay 59% more in equity, 36% more in cash, and 40% more in total to their top 
managers. After the data is adjusted based on the cost of living index one by one, 
these gaps disappear. Executives of companies in smaller cities gain only 7.4% less 
equity compensation than their counterparts in companies in mega cities. They even 
receive 6.2% more in cash and 3.6% in total compensation. Compensation structures 
of top managers in mega and smaller cities also present little distinction. The former 
consists of 17.22% equity compensation and 82.78% cash compensation, while the 
numbers for the latter are 19.25% and 80.75% respectively. (2) After I adjust the 
compensation by the cost of living index, I find that smaller cities contribute more 
toward executives’ total and cash compensation, but significantly depresses equity 
incentives. This is consistent with my prediction that executives in smaller cities can 
exert influence on their compensation. (3) The pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
companies in smaller cities is significantly lower than that of companies in mega 
cities in general representing the inefficiency of the contract between agents and 
shareholders. However, the factor of smaller cities is indistinguishable in equity 
compensation for performance sensitivity suggesting that equity-based compensation 
is less influenced by senior management. (4) Institutional investors and board size 
thought to be an effective method to reduce information asymmetry in other papers 
and to play an important and prominent role in developed countries do not influence 
executives’ compensation as expected. They cannot mitigate the negative effect of 
smaller cities on the design of executive compensation. The number of the board 
directors is positively correlated to executive compensation. Both the number of board 
directors and the proportion of shares held by institutional investors are negatively 
correlated to total pay-for-performance sensitivity and cash compensation for 
performance sensitivity. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide a literature review relevant 
to executives’ performance and geography. I also briefly describe the background of 
the Chinese market in this section. Section 3 outlines my data and provides 
8 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains the main empirical results. In Section 5, I 
conduct the robustness tests, while Section 6 concludes my study and discusses the 
possible contributions and limitations of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The literature review is made up of two major parts: (1) the study of executive 
compensation and the performance of companies, and (2) the geographic influence on 
firms and investors. 
 
2.1. Executives’ Compensation and the Performance of Companies. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduce “agency theory” to reveal the contradiction 
between managers and shareholders. Jensen (1986) also points out the conflict 
between managers’ power and shareholders’ interests. However, the concept of 
“agency costs,” which includes compensation policies to control agents’ behavior into 
the theory of the firm, predicts a positive correlation between compensation and firm 
performance. Fama (1980) further explains that managers who are separated from 
shareholders can run companies efficiently as their compensation was determined by 
their past performance. These three articles cast light upon the possibility of the 
separation of agents and shareholders and the importance of executive compensation 
to corporation governance. A number of studies investigate the relation between 
managers’ compensation and firm performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) contend 
that social equity and public opinion restrain the possibility to reward senior 
executives more. For this reason, companies fail to design a compensation system to 
inspire their CEOs effectively, leading to poorer performance by the firms. This paper 
identifies the importance of the incentive effect of executive compensation. Murphy 
(1999) further conducts a comprehensive summary of executive compensation and 
pay-performance sensitivity in the U.S. at that time. He pools approaches of 
measuring performance and huge volumes of data regarding compensation in stocks, 
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options, and cash. Then, he confirms that stock performance and option performance 
sensitivity are positive in mining and manufacturing industries, financial industries, 
wholesale and retail trade industries, and service industries and are more significant in 
small companies. Hanlon et al. (2003) gauge the impact of stock options for top 
managers on business performance in the future. They find that every dollar of option 
given to the top five managers will result in a $3.71 increase in operating income in 
next five years. Carpenter (2000) suggests that options can influence managers’ risk 
preferences that can change their managerial behaviors. Managers receiving 
out-of-money options are inclined to increase the risk of assets, while those receiving 
in-the-money options tend to choose lower asset volatility. Spraggon and Bodolica 
(2011) investigate CEO behavior in acquisitions and find that stock option incentives 
are the key to optimizing financing choices and maintaining company performance 
after acquisition. While Western scholars try to determine the mechanism as to how 
compensation, especially equity-based compensation, stimulates senior managers and 
to better examine the compensation system, most Chinese scholars only concentrate 
on cash compensation and the relation between the ownership of enterprises and 
pay-performance sensitivity due to the background of the Chinese economic 
reformation and limited data source. 
Many enterprises are owned by the Chinese government or used to be owned by the 
Chinese government. Most Chinese articles on this topic choose to compare the 
difference between SOEs and Non-SOEs inevitably. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006, 2007) 
identify the positive pay-performance relation both in Chinese SOEs and Non-SOEs 
and find foreign investors can augment this relation. They also suggest that 
Non-SOEs and companies with foreign shareholders pay more to their executives. 
Kato and Long’s results (2006) support the positive pay-performance relation in 
Chinese companies but suggest that government ownership will diminish the 
relationship between a company’s performance and executive compensation. Buck, 
Liu, and Skovorodz (2008) investigate pay-performance and the performance-pay 
relationship. In their case, performance-pay elasticity is 0.25, which is similar to the 
data of the U.S. and UK, while the pay-performance elasticity is only 0.015. Conyon 
10 
and He (2011) go beyond cash compensation. They measure equity incentives by 
using the ratio of CEOs’ shareholdings and the changes in the CEOs’ equity value. 
They determine that CEOs’ incentives are negatively correlated with company size 
and positively correlated with company performance and the ratio of the market value 
to book value. Adithipyangkul, Alon, and Zhang (2011) include perks that contain 
management perquisites and expenditures for meals, travel, and entertainment in their 
study and find a positive relation to performance. Conyon and He (2011) add 
independent directors to their model and find enterprises with more independent 
directors tend to replace CEOs during declining performance. Lam, McGuinness, and 
Vieito (2013) use gender as a key element in their study. However, the link between 
gender and pay-performance is insignificant. 
 
2.2. Geographic Influence on Firms and Investors 
 
The geographic influence on firms and investors is present in almost every respect. 
Brennan and Cao (1997) determine that investors perform much better when investing 
in domestic stocks. Stotz (2011) concur with their findings. Private equity can earn 
10%-13% on domestic targets every year, while only 1%-3% on foreign targets. Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999) corroborate the advantage of U.S. investment managers on 
local portfolios. They attribute this advantage to easier information acquisition for 
local companies. They reinforce their opinion by researching U.S. fund managers. 
Their results demonstrate that fund managers can gain prominent abnormal returns in 
local investment managers who live in remote areas with small companies nearby can 
earn greater profits on the proximate investment (Coval and Moskowitz 2001). 
Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) record a similar phenomenon in U.S. general 
households. In their study, the average abnormal annualized return of households’ 
local investment is 3.2%. Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2007) prove that analysts can predict 
the earnings of domestic companies more precisely providing a solid foundation in 
terms of earning abnormal returns. Brown et al. (2004) argue that community plays an 
influential role in investment. Investors, especially investors with less financial 
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knowledge, are inclined to imitate other members in the same community. This result 
implies that familiarity exists not only in investment targets, but in situations around 
investors affecting investment propensity dramatically. 
As for enterprises, Loughran and Schultz (2005) compare the stock liquidity of 
urban and rural companies. They find that rural stocks are traded much less with 
higher trading costs, covered by fewer analysts, and held by fewer institutions. 
Loughran (2008) extended his study to seasoned equity offerings. He finds that rural 
companies issue new shares less frequently than urban companies due to the cost of 
information. Investors are willing to invest in stocks in which they are familiar. Rural 
companies do not have investors nearby. They must pay more to acquaint remote 
investors with their firms. Not only is the liquidity of stocks influenced by location, 
but stock price is also affected by location. Stock prices co-move with the stock prices 
of other companies in the same area (Pirinsky and Wang 2006; Kumar et al. 2013). 
When a company moves its headquarters to a new location, its stock price will move 
more synchronously with the stock prices of firms from the new location rather than 
with those from the old location. Barker and Loughran (2007) further quantized this 
co-movement and confirm the significance in their research. When two companies are 
100 miles closer, the coefficient of their stock prices will increase 12 basis points. 
Literature regarding the geographic effect on executive compensation has become 
more popular in recent years. However, research on the effect of urban agglomeration 
on employees’ wages is not new. Productivity increases 4%-5% in urban areas of the 
U.S. and European developed countries (Ciccone 2002). It is natural to probe the 
relative level of wages of urban residents. Wheeler (2001) and Bacolod et al. (2009) 
find higher pricing for skilled workers in urban areas. Addario and Patacchini (2008) 
estimate that for every 100,000 additional people participating in the local labor 
market wages will increase by 0.1% in Italy. The population 12 kilometers away from 
the market will not contribute to this effect. Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) further 
demonstrate that enterprises adopt an option grants system, similar to the system of 
firms in the neighbor, for their general staff. Nonetheless, they do not find a 
geographic effect on executives’ equity-based compensation. Bouwman (2012) and 
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Francis et al. (2016) examine the geographical effects on executives’ salary 
respectively. Bouwman (2012) concentrates on the affects from other companies in 
the neighborhood, while Francis et al. (2016) focuses on the efficacy of the size of 
cities. In general, urban CEOs earn 25% more than rural CEOs after adjusting for the 
cost of living. A CEO’s compensation will increase 0.3% when the compensation of 
other CEOs in their neighbor increases 1%. Zhang and Chung (2018) and Bhabra and 
Hossain (2018) further analyze the structure of executive compensation in the U.S. 
and Canada. In the U.S., rural executives tend to receive a lower proportion of 
incentive compensation and have lower pay-performance sensitivity. In Canada, rural 
executives receive a higher portion of equity-based compensation representing greater 
incentive function and higher pay-performance sensitivity. 
 
2.3. Institutional Background 
 
In order to make better understanding of the purpose of this paper and my selection 
of the subject of study, I provide a brief description of the background of Chinese 
capital markets and Chinese market reform. In the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping put forward a policy 
of reforming the domestic economy and opening China to the world. The domestic 
reformation is a complex and huge project that contains millions of measures and 
tasks to improve industrial production, education, and medical treatment, etc. The 
most important and fundamental goal of the reformation is to bring a market-oriented 
economy back to China. In a planned economy era, not only did the Chinese 
government determine the production of enterprises, it also established a hierarchical 
salary system that was applied to all of the Chinese working people. The system 
ranked all of the positions into dozens of tiers and stipulated the salary for each tier. 
For example, a company has a manager in charge of production and another manager 
in charge of the purchase of raw material. In a modern company, these two managers 
may earn different wages as the importance of these two departments may be different. 
In a Chinese company at that time, it was highly possible to earn the same wage as 
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they are ranked in the same tier. Even two managers in different companies likely 
earned the equal wage as the salary system was universal throughout mainland China 
although it was adjusted slightly according to the location and industries. Some 
institutions, like schools and manufacturing shops, did not have many tiers in 
management. They would introduce skill or seniority rating systems to rank their 
employees. In junior schools, except for the support crews who maintained the 
infrastructure of the school, all of the staff would be classified into several positions, 
such as principal, director of teaching and discipline, leader of the grade, and ordinary 
teacher. Only about ten people took the first three positions above. The remaining 
100-200 staff was ranked into eight tiers based on their seniority. Similarly, in 
manufacturing shops, workers were ranked by their skills into eight tiers. Workers in 
the same tier would earn equal salaries no matter how many products they could 
produce in a month. While the Chinese government criticized equalitarianism for 
many times and attempted to apply the principle that emphasizes better pay for more 
work and distribution according production until 1978, piece rate pay was not widely 
used in Chinese factories. In a planned economy, the country runs like a machine 
controlled by the central government, and firms act as components of the machine. All 
of the managers in the Chinese firms had to be concerned about were yield and quality. 
They did not focus on price, costs, revenue, and profit as the Chinese government 
would take all the profits and cover the deficit. 
After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 
1978, a private economy sprouted in China. Although the Chinese government did not 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the private economy at the time, the Responsibility 
Contract System produced a virtual existence of a private economy in China. The 
system permitted some small factories and small firms to be responsible for their own 
profits and losses. Companies could sign contracts with governments that 
predetermined the yield to be delivered to the government. These companies could 
sell the portion that exceeded the output quota in the markets. They also needed to 
purchase the missing parts when production was below the output quota. Meanwhile, 
the government expanded the autonomy of large SOEs and increased the quota 
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retention of overall profits. These companies started to manage their production and 
sales and to distribute the profits more independently. In 1980, the state implemented 
the profit retention system for enterprises. A certain proportion of the total wages of 
the workers and staff could extract rewards from the profits. The method of counting 
wages by points and floating wages by piecework was also tried in some local 
enterprises combining the production responsibility system with economic benefits. 
Since the end of 1984, the contracted output quota delivered to the state has been 
cancelled. To replace the Responsibility Contract System, the Chinese government 
introduced a tax on enterprises and started taking a 55% cut of the profits of firms. 
The reforms above were largely regional and simply laid the groundwork for a 
nationwide reform of the salary system. Chinese companies did not get rid of the 
salary system, which is primarily age- and seniority-based, until the beginning of 
1985. At this time, the state council gave the internal wage distribution rights of 
enterprises back to the enterprises. Under the state's macro-control and policy 
guidance, enterprises could independently establish their compensation system in line 
with their strategic requirements and their production characteristics. Although 
political reasons impeded the marketization reform from 1988-1992, after Deng 
Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, the reform and opening-up policy has been 
implemented to this day. The modern enterprise compensation system continues to 
exist and evolve in China, and Chinese enterprises retain discretion in the independent 
establishment of a compensation system. It is about time that the performance of 
Chinese enterprises administers executive compensation directly. 
In the early 1990s, the basically established market economy and capital market 
and the relatively liberal policies expedited the evolution both of privately-owned and 
state-owned companies. The modern enterprise compensation system also burgeoned 
in China. However, equity-based compensation has been slow to develop. In 1993, 
China Vanke Co. firstly started its pilot scheme of compensation containing a stock 
option package in China. Shanghai INESA holding group was the first state-owned 
enterprise to implement a stock option incentive system in 1997. Tianjin Qinda Co., 
Ltd. also explored the implementation of stock option incentives in 1998. Since then, 
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stock ownership incentives have made relatively little progress. Only a few companies 
implemented an equity incentive plan. This may be the reason that previous scholars 
did not take equity-based compensation into consideration. In 2005, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) formally introduced Equity Incentive 
Management Measures (trial implementation) for listed companies stimulating equity 
incentives. In 2011, the number of listed companies granting stock options surpassed 
100 for the first time. In May 2016, the Equity Incentive Management Measures of 
Listed Companies was officially implemented opening the door for equity incentives 
in listed companies. In that year, the number of announcements implementing equity 
incentives increased to 272. Equity incentives took off and, in 2017, the number 
soared to 447. Such a vigorous development provides me with an opportunity for my 
research. However, it can also be said that the development of equity incentives in 
China is just beginning to get on track. It is not advisable to simply apply the situation 
of developed countries in Europe and America to the Chinese market. To understand 
the effect of equity incentives on Chinese enterprises, we must do a lot of research. 
The explosive growth of equity incentives does not apply to SOEs. Of the 1, 000 or 
so SOEs, only about 30 had granted equity incentives in 2017. Due to the special 
nature of state-owned enterprises, they cannot operate completely on their own as 
private enterprises can. There are three main restrictions on executive compensation 
in SOEs. First, the reform of executive compensation for SOEs is incomplete. The 
multiple of executive compensation relative to the average salary of employees is an 
important indicator in determining executive compensation of the SOEs. The 
hierarchical wage system of the era of the planned economy is still in partial operation. 
In fact, the state council still made it the goal of reform to genuinely delegate the 
power of internal distribution of the total payroll to enterprises in 2018, implying the 
SOEs’ lack of autonomy in their salary system. In addition, the executive 
compensation system of SOEs is under strict scrutiny by society, social media, and the 
public (Conyon and He 2008; Adithipyangkul et al. 2011). After the Chinese Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security introduced a wage restriction policy in 2015, 
SOE executive compensation has decreased about 50%. Private CEOs have been paid 
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more than twice as much as their state-owned counterparts, in general, in many 
industries. Even in this situation, the public still criticizes the level of SOE executive 
compensation. As a result, senior managers in SOEs are prone to be paid in some 
indirect ways using perks including a company car, a housing allowance, travel 
expenses and apparel expenses, etc. Perks, which don't have to be disclosed, account 
for 15%-32% of the total compensation package (Adithipyangkul et al. 2011). The 
preference for undisclosed compensation implies executives’ attitudes as to what 
needs to be disclosed. Finally, equity incentives of SOEs are easily labeled as "the 
loss of state-owned assets." Equity incentives of SOEs must be reported to the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). SASAC 
is generally very cautious about the review and filing of equity incentive programs as 
management of SOEs are always concerned with the safety and efficiency of 
state-owned assets. Thus, it is almost impossible for equity incentives to be widely 
applied in SOEs until the government conducts a lot of experiments to ensure the 
safety of state-owned assets. Based on the background above, it is difficult to obtain 
effective data regarding compensation and abundant data concerning equity incentives 
from SOEs for research. 
Apart from the lack of data, there are other issues with SOEs that could affect 
research. The main one is the potentially poor quality of information of SOEs. SOEs 
are owned by the Chinese government. Listed companies are also supervised by the 
Chinese government. The Chinese government is acting like a player and a referee in 
a game. It is hard to guarantee a high quality of information disclosed to investors. 
Some SOEs go public to show the company as a good asset and sell it for a good price. 
It is hard to imagine that the CSRC will stand in the way of the SASAC. Additionally, 
there is pressure on domestic audit institutions (Buck et al. 2008). Moreover, due to 
the demand for macro policies or some special strategy targets, the government will 
present specific requirements for the operation of SOEs. For example, they may have 
to hire new employees to increase the employment rate even when their performance 
does not warrant this. These potential problems will impair the link between executive 
compensation and the firms’ performance. I hope to focus my study on the listed 
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Non-SOEs rather than SOEs. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
 
I obtain the data of executives’ cash compensation, fundamental accounting 
statistics of companies, and basic characters of executives from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA 
Information Technology Company. The data of location and executives’ equity-based 
compensation comes from financial statements on CNINFO. CNINFO is a website 
that was developed by Shenzhen Securities Information Co., Ltd. And has been the 
designated information disclosure website of CSRC since 2000. Chinese listed 
companies are regulated to calculate the value of equity compensation using the 
Black-Scholes Model. The data on air quality is acquired from the China air quality 
online monitoring and analysis platform. The cost of living index is derived from the 
Per Capita Consumption Expenditure of Urban Residents (PCCEUR) that is obtained 
in cities’ local statistical yearbooks and the Statistical Bulletin on National Economic 
and Social Development. 
I filtered my data using following steps. First, I selected 1,501 A-Share listed 
non-state-owned companies that provide data in all six years from 2012-2017. In 
order to get rid of the influence of the government more thoroughly, I excluded 
companies whose top three shareholders include government institutions and reduced 
the sample to 1,191 companies. I further deleted companies that traded their stock for 
less than six months in a year and had 1,063 companies remaining. Later, I compared 
the headquarters addresses of these companies from 2013-2017. Companies that 
moved their headquarters to different cities are eliminated. I delete them as they 
caused two problems that adversely affected subsequent research. The first issue is 
that companies moving their headquarters to different cities make it harder to classify 
them. For example, how to classify a company that moved its’ headquarters from a 
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smaller city to a mega city in June 2015? Neither a small city company nor a mega 
city company is a good fit. Another problem is that a company may change its 
headquarters because it was acquired. Chinese stock market adopts authorization 
system. The acquirer will use the stock code of the acquired public company. In this 
case, the company corresponding to the stock code becomes another company 
completely, and it is unreasonable to use its data to calculate the changes in 
performance and salary for later research. Next, I used the GDP and population data 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China to identify mega cities. Here, I 
selected the top 14 cities whose GDP exceeded one trillion RMB in 2017 as mega 
cities. And I also added one more city, Ningbo, as its GDP is 985 billion RMB, which 
is really close to the standard of one trillion yuan. Then, I divided the companies into 
companies in mega cities and companies in smaller cities according to the location of 
their headquarters. I use the definition of mega cities and smaller cities rather than 
rural and urban areas used in prior studies due to the large Chinese population. It is 
hard to call a city with millions of people a rural area even though its economy may 
be underdeveloped. Finally, I checked their operating revenue in 2017 and deleted 
several companies whose data is too far away from the overall data and kept 894 
companies in my sample providing 4,470 firm-year observations for my study. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
I first provide a general description of the cities’ GDP, population, and the number 
of listed Non-SOEs. There are 435 Non-SOEs in 15 mega cities. In the three biggest 
cities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, there are 223 companies. The rest of the 459 
companies are distributed in 133 smaller cities. The agglomeration of listed 
companies is obvious in this respect. I also find that the average population of mega 
cities is much larger than that of smaller cities (13.71 million vs. 5.41 million). Thus, 
at first glance, the idea that companies in mega cities can cover more investors is valid. 




Basic Statistics of Cities 






















Shanghai 3,013.3 24.18 60 
Beijing 2,800 21.71 83 
Shenzhen, Guangdong 2,228.6 10.90 80 
Guangzhou, Guangdong 2,150 14.04 20 
Chongqing, 1,953 33.72 7 
Tianjin 1,859.5 15.47 9 
Suzhou, Jiangsu 1,700 10.65 30 
Chengdu, Sichuan 1,389 15.92 28 
Wuhan, Hubei 1,340 10.77 12 
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 1,255.6 9.19 52 
Nanjing, Jiangsu 1,171.5 8.27 10 
Qingdao, Shandong 1,125.8 8.71 7 
Wuxi, Jiangsu 1,051.1 6.53 9 
Changsha, Hunan 1,020 7.65 13 
Ningbo, Zhejiang 985 7.88 15 
 Total  205.59 435 
 Average  13.71 29 
Smaller Cities Total (133 cities)  718.65 459 
 Average  5.41 3.45 
 
Then, I divided China into regions according to the city map, and used different 
colors to indicate the density of A-share listed companies in China and population 
density in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. This approach illustrates the agglomeration of 
listed Non-SOEs visually. It is not difficult to see that the three pictures have great 
consistency. In particular, the areas covered by the deepest color in Figure 1 and the 
two deepest colors in Figures 2 and 3 have a high degree of consistency. Figure 2 
indicates that most listed Non-SOEs are in the eastern half of China. Similarly, Figure 
3 demonstrates that most cities with a population of over 4 million are also in the 
eastern half of China. If I raise the standard to 10 million people, which is the 
classification standard adopted by the Chinese government, all the metropolises in 
China, except Chengdu and Chongqing, are in eastern China. These metropolises 
either belong to mega cities as defined by me or are around mega cities defined by me. 
The concentration of the population in eastern China provides crude confirmation that 
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Chinese companies in mega cities can spread information more quickly and widely to 
investors than companies in smaller cities with fewer investors around. 
Figure 1. 





Map of the Listed Non-SOEs in China 
 
Figure 3. 
Map of Population in China 
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For example, Beijing, a city of 20 million people and defined as one of the mega cities, 
is less than 100 kilometers away from one city of at least 15 million people, one city 
with population over 10 million, and three cities of at least four million people. A 
company establishing their headquarters in Beijing will cover more than 58 million 
people. Xi’an is one of the largest cities defined as smaller cities. Xi’an has a 
population of 9.6 million. Within a 100-kilometer radius of Xi 'an, there are two cities 
with a population of over four million. A Xi’an-based company will only cover about 
20 million people. This difference in information dissemination provides executives in 
smaller cities with one of the prerequisites for more favorable salary design to 
themselves. 
In Table 2, I present the descriptive statistics concerning my independent variables. 
I divide all of the data into two groups according to mega cities and smaller cities. As 
seen in the table, some statistical values of the independent variables of smaller cities 
are very close to their counterparts of mega cities. Statistics, such as total operating 
revenue (REV_GROWTH), return on assets (ROA), leverage (LEVERAGE), the ratio 
of market to book value (MKT-TO-BOOK), stock returns (STCK_RETURN), CEOs’ 
gender (CEO GENDER), and the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder 
(LARGEST_SH), show very small and insignificant gaps. The difference in air 
quality at headquarters’ locations (AIR QUALITY) of mega cities and AIR 
QUALITY of smaller cities is only 2.472 but is statistically significant. The 
companies in mega cities only have 0.139fewer board directors, on average, but the 
difference is also significant. The remaining data presents more distinct and 
significant differences. In 32% of the companies in smaller cities, the same person 
holds the post of CEO and Chairman of the Board, while 37.3% of companies in 
mega cities have the same person as the CEO and Chairman of the Board. Enterprises 
in smaller cities make 3.09-billion-yuan total operating revenue (TOTAL REVENUE) 
in RMB, while enterprises in mega cities earn 3.35 billion yuan in RMB, on average. 
Similarly, enterprises in smaller cities earn 4.71 billion yuan earnings in RMB before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), which is 8% less than the 
EBITDA of companies in mega cities. The total assets (TOTAL ASSETS) of 
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companies in smaller cities are 5.95 billion yuan in RMB. The total assets of 
enterprises in mega cities are 21.8% higher, reaching 7.25 billion yuan in RMB. 
Owners’ equity (OWN_EQUITY) of companies in smaller cities is 2.82 billion yuan 
in RMB, 13.5% lower than that of enterprises in mega cities (3.26 billion yuan). The 
statistics in the cost of living index (LIV_COST_INDEX) and market value 
(MKT_VALUE) also show big differences. In smaller cities, the cost of living index is 
114.32, but in mega cities, the number is as high as 160.766. The average market 
value of enterprises in smaller cities is 8.93 billion yuan in RMB, while that of 
enterprises in mega cities is 10.99 billion yuan in RMB. Companies in smaller cities 
and in mega cities also show some differences in terms of the ratio of shares held by 
institutional investors (INSTITUTION) and the consistency between the founder and 
the controller (FOUNDER). Institutional investors hold an average of 4.8% of the 
shares in firms in smaller cities and 5.2% of shares in firms in mega cities. In mega 
cities, 74.1% of the founders control their companies, while in smaller cities, only 
66.9% of the founders are still in control. 
 
Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics on Companies 
Variables Smaller Cities   Mega Cities   Difference 
 Number Mean  Number Mean  M-S 
TOTAL REVENUE 2,295 30.947  2175 33.502  2.554 * 
REV_GROWTH 2,295 0.273  2175 0.288  0.015 
EBITDA 2,295 4.711  2175 5.120  0.409 * 
TOTAL ASSETS 2,295 59.488  2175 72.452  12.96 *** 
ROA 2,295 0.078  2175 0.077  -0.001 
OWN_EQUITY 2,295 28.209  2175 32.614  4.405 *** 
LEVERAGE 2,295 0.028  2175 0.030  0.002 
MKT_VALUE 2,295 89.274  2175 109.923  20.649 *** 
MKT-TO-BOOK 2,295 5.140  2175 5.486  0.346 
STCK_RETURN 2,295 0.127  2175 0.132  0.005 
LIV_COST_INDEX 2,295 114.320  2175 160.766  46.446 *** 
AIR QUALITY 1,836 84.578  1740 87.050  2.472 *** 
CEO GENDER 2,295 0.071  2175 0.072  -0.001 
FOUNDER 2,295 0.669  2175 0.741  0.071 *** 
CEO&CHAIR 2,295 0.320  2175 0.373  0.053 *** 
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TOTAL REVENUE is defined as the total operating revenue. REV_GROWTH is the growth rate of a company's total operating 
revenue. EBITDA is the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. Chinese companies do not provide this 
statistic in their financial statements. I use the formula EBITDA = Net Profit + Interest Expense +Income Tax +Depreciation +  
Amortization to calculate the data. ROA is the EBITDA divided by TOTAL ASSETS. OWN_EQUITY represents the owners’ 
equity. LEVERAGE is the long-term debt divided by TOTAL ASSETS. MKT-TO-BOOK is the market value (MKT_VALUE) 
divided by the book value. STCK_RETURN is the stock return of the year before the financial statements. LIV_COST_INDEX 
is the cost of living index of 147 cities where 894 Non-SOEs are located. AIR QUALITY is calculated based on the average of 
the air pollution indices for each day of the year. CEO GENDER is the dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO is a female 
and zero otherwise. The value of FOUNDER is one when the founder is the same as the controller and zero otherwise. 
CEO&CHAIR is a dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO and the Chairman of the Board is the person and zero otherwise. 
LARGEST_SH stands for the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder. INSTITUTION is the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors. NUM_DIRECTORS is the number of directors of a company. 
*, **, and *** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics on executives’ compensation after 
winsorizing them at 1% level to avoid the influence of outliers. Due to the limitations 
of database used in this study, I had to choose the top three executives’ cash 
compensation of each company at first. Then, I retrieved these executives’ equity 
compensation and calculated their total compensation. The data of equity 
compensation is collected from the announcements of equity incentives plans. The 
value of equity compensation is calculated based on the Black-Scholes Model. This 
method is admissible by CSRC. Although the figure would differ from the actual top 
three executives' earnings, it will be valid given that executives with relatively high 
cash compensation also tend to have relatively high equity incentives. I will use CEO 
compensation in the robustness check to ensure the reliability of my study. 
In this table, I find that executives in mega cities earn more in total compensation, 
equity compensation, and cash compensation than executives in smaller cities. The 
top three executives in mega cities earn 2,672,000 yuan in total, 391,000 yuan in 
equity, and 2,282,000 yuan in cash a year, while their counterparts in smaller cities 
earn 1,895,000 yuan (29.08% less), 260,000 yuan (33.50% less), and 1,635,000 yuan 
(28.35% less). After I adjusted their compensation by the cost of living index shown 
in Panel B, the gap narrowed considerably. I deflated compensation one by one 
LARGEST_SH 2,295 0.312  2175 0.318  0.005 
INSTITUTION 2,295 0.048  2175 0.052  0.004 *** 
NUM_DIRECTORS 2,295 8.260  2175 8.121  -0.139 *** 
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according to the annual price index for each city. The results presented in Panel C 
show the dramatically reduced gaps. Executives in smaller cities become overpaid by 
2.69% in total compensation and 3.79% in cash compensation, but are still underpaid 
3.67% in equity compensation. The differences in all three kinds of compensation 
become statistically insignificant and decrease dramatically. 
Although the differences in compensation narrow after the adjustment, I still find 
that executives in mega cities earn more in equity-based compensation. This gap 
reflected in the compensation structure is about 0.9% and is small, but significant (e.g., 
shown in Panel D). Prior to the adjustment, the proportion of cash income of 
executives in smaller cities is 0.88% higher than that of executives in mega cities. 
After the adjustment, the difference becomes 0.91%. The result is in line with 
previous expectations that management in smaller cities can exert greater influence on 
the design of their compensation structure to increase the share of cash compensation 
that is more stable and low risk. However, this evidence alone cannot strongly prove 
that executives in smaller cities exert greater influence on their compensation 
structure. I conduct more empirical tests in the next section.  
 
Table 3. 
Descriptive Statistics on Compensation 
Panel A Compensations 
 
 Smaller Cities Mega Cities Difference (S-M) P-value 
Number 2,295 2,175  
 
Total Compensation (000s) 1,895 2,672 -777 (-29.08%) 0 *** 
Cash Compensation (000s) 1,635 2,282 -647 (-28.35%) 0 *** 
Equity Compensation (000s) 260 391 -193 (-33.50%) 0 *** 
     
Panel B Living Cost Index 
 
 Smaller Cities Mega Cities Difference (S-M) P-value 
Number 2,295 2,175   
Living Cost Index 114.32 160.77 -46.45 0 *** 
     
Panel C Compensation Adjusted by Living Cost Index (One-to-one correspondence) 
 Smaller Cities Mega Cities Difference (S-M) P-value 
Number 2,295 2,175   
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*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The descriptive results above have broadly shown differences in executive pay 
structures between mega cities and smaller cities indicating that executives in smaller 
cities use their power to earn a higher proportion of cash compensation. In this section, 
I conduct empirical research on the mechanism behind executive compensation and to 
understand the structure of executive compensation more deeply. 
First, I calculate the correlation of the variables used in my regression model. 
Because cash compensation and equity compensation are highly correlated with total 
compensation, Table 4 just reports the results of the correlation based on total 
compensation for the sake of brevity. I find that with the exception of two variables, 
the AREAS variables and LIV_COST_INDEX variables are strongly correlated. None 
of the other variables show a strong correlation. These two variables are essential to 
my empirical research. Therefore, I decided to adjust executive compensation by 
LIV_COST_INDEX (cost of living index) first and then carry out a regression 
analysis on AREAS. 
Total Compensation (000s) 1,716 1,671 45 (2.69%) 0.367 
Cash Compensation (000s) 1,480 1,426 54 (3.79%) 0.133 
Equity Compensation (000s) 236 245 -9 (3.67%) 0.778 
     
Panel D Proportion of Compensation 
 Smaller Cities Mega Cities Difference (S-M) P-value 
Number 2,295 2,175   
Total Compensation (000s) 100% 100% 0%  
Cash Compensation (000s) 86.28% 85.40% 0.88% 0.01 *** 
Equity Compensation (000s) 13.72% 14.60% -0.88% 0.01 *** 
Number     
Ad Total Compensation (000s) 100% 100% 0%  
Ad Cash Compensation (000s) 86.25% 85.34% 0.91% 0.01 *** 
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4.1 Basic Executives’ Compensation Regression 
 
I adopt an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression below to determine the basic 
relationship between executive compensation and geography  
 
LN(COMPENSATION) = β0 + β1 * LN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 * AREAS + β3 * ROA 
+ β4 * LEVERAGE + β5 * MKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * EC 
OR NOT + ε                                (1) 
 
I use the natural log of executive compensation, which is widely used in the 
literature (Firth et al. 2006; Harford and Li 2007; Conyon and He 2011; Bhabra and 
Hossain 2018) including total compensation, cash compensation, and equity 
compensation, as my dependent variables. As the equity compensation may equal to 
zero, I add a value of one to ensure the availability of the natural log. 
LN(TOTAL_REV) is the natural log of total operating revenue for each company. 
AREAS is a dummy variable set equal to one if the headquarters of company is 
located in a smaller city and zero otherwise. ROA, LEVERAGE, and 
MKT-TO-BOOK are the same as the previous definition. ROA is EBITDA divided by 
total assets. LEVERAGE is long-term debt divided by total assets. MKT-TO-BOOK 
is the market value divided by the book value. EC OR NOT is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one when the top three executives are given equity incentives and 
zero otherwise. As equity-based compensation did not become a regular form of 
compensation paid to executives by Chinese listed companies until 2017, many 
instances of equity compensation are zero. Equity compensation cannot be less than 
zero. Hence, I use a Tobit model to conduct regressions on equity compensation. 
Table 5 reports the results for the regressions on total compensation, cash 
compensation, and equity compensation in Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. 
The results indicate that a company's operating revenue is positively related to the 
executives’ total compensation, cash compensation, and equity compensation. When 
companies earn more operating revenue, they will pay more to their executives.  
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Analogously, a higher return on assets will prominently lead to greater compensation 
of all kinds. These results are consistent with the results in other articles focusing on 
the Chinese market (Conyon and He 2011; Firth et al. 2006). 
 
Table 5. 
Basic Executives’ Compensation Regression 
LN (TOTAL_COM), LN(CASH_COM), and LN(EQUITY_COM+1) are the natural logs of executives’ total compensation, cash 
compensation, and equity compensation, respectively. LN (TOTAL _REV) represents the natural log of the total operating 
revenue. AREAS is a dummy variable set equal to one if the company is located in smaller cities and zero otherwise. ROA is 
EBITDA divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is long-term debt divided by total assets. MKT-TO-BOOK is the market value 
divided by the book value. EC OR NOT is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the top three executives are given 
equity incentives and zero otherwise.  
For Columns (1) and (2), I use t-statistics to indicate significance. For Columns (3), I use z-statistics as the indicator.  
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Common sense dictates that larger and better performing companies tend to pay 
their management more. AREAS is negatively associated with all kinds of executive 
compensation as predicted. In other words, companies in smaller cities will pay less 
compensation to their executives. The data is in accord with the summary statistics in 
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Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4,470  4,470  4,470 
R-squared 0.434  0.339   
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Table 3 implying that the effects of areas primarily come from the differences in the 
cost of living of each city. I also find that LEVERAGE and MKT-TO-BOOK have a 
positive effect on executives’ total and cash compensation. Table 2 reports that the 
average leverage ratio of firms in my sample is only 0.028 and more than 50% of the 
sample has zero leverage. I infer that higher leverage at this low overall level 
represents better track records and greater strength of companies. A higher 
market-to-book ratio often means more growth potential. It is intuitive to expect that 
companies with higher leverage and market-to-book ratios may perform better and 
pay more to their executives. EC OR NOT is a control variable to indicate the equity 
compensation grants. Equity incentives constitute about 18% of the compensation of 
the top three executives. It is natural to observe the significance of EC OR NOT. 
 
4.2 Executives’ Compensation Regression Controlling for Living Cost Index 
 
To estimate the effect of geography, I must eliminate the effect of the cost of living 
on executive compensation. The variable LIV_COST_INDEX is based on the 
following steps. First, I collect the PCCEUR from cities’ local statistical yearbooks 
and the Statistical Bulletin on National Economic and Social Development of each 
city from 2013-2017. For several cities that did not publish complete data, I estimate 
the missing data based on past data and growth rates or chose data from neighboring 
cities or provincial averages data to substitute. Then, I calculate the median of the 
PCCEUR for every year and use the results as a benchmark for every year. The 
indices of the benchmark were set as 100. Finally, I divide the PCCEUR of each city 
by the median of PCCEUR of the same year and multiply it by 100 to derive the cost 
of living index. However, I cannot add the variable LIV_COST_INDEX into the 
model directly as it is highly correlated with the variable AREAS. Thus, I adjust 
compensation with LIV_COST_INDEX as the adjusted compensation and take the 
natural logarithm of the adjusted compensation as the dependent variable. LN 
(ADJUSTED TOTAL_COM), LN (ADJUSTED CASH_COM), and LN (ADJUSTED 
EQUITY_COM+1) are the natural log of executives’ adjusted total compensation, 
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cash compensation, and equity compensation, respectively. As in Equation (1), I also 
add the value one to ensure the availability of the natural log of the adjusted equity 
compensation. Then, I use the regression model below to examine the relationship 
between the companies’ location and executive compensation: 
 
LN(ADJUSTED COMPENSATION) = β0 + β1 * LN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 * 
AREAS + β3 * ROA + β4 * LEVERAGE + β5 * 
MKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * EC OR NOT + ε         (2) 
 
Table 6. 
Controlling for the Living Cost Index 
Adjusted LN(TOTAL_COM), Adjusted LN(CASH_COM), and Adjusted LN(EQUITY_COM+1) are the natural log of 
executives’ adjusted total compensation, cash compensation, and equity compensation, respectively. For Columns (1) and (2), I 
use t-statistics to indicate the significance. For Column (3), I use z-statistics as the indicator. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In order to eliminate the effects of outliers, I use Studentized Residuals and Cook’s 
 （1）  （2）  （3） 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
TOTAL_COM) 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
CASH_COM) 





















































Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4,470  4,470  4,470 
R-squared 0.3829  0.2777   
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Distance to select the outliers. I delete all of the outliers and rerun the regression. For 
brevity, I only demonstrate the results of the regression on LN (ADJUSTED 
TOTAL_COM) after checking for outliers in Table 6.1. I find that the significance of 
the variables remains almost the same. Only MKT-TO-BOOK becomes insignificant 
after deleting the outliers. MKT-TO-BOOK is not the focus of my study, and its 
coefficient is very small. I find that outliers have little impact on the results and do not 
change my conclusions. I also have rerun the tests by excluding cities with missing 
data and the results are still the same. Thus, I still use the original data to continue my 
study. 
Table 6 reports the results for Equation (2). Except AREAS, the relationship 
between all of the independent variables and the dependent variables remains 
basically the same as that in Equation (1). The relation between AREAS and 
executive compensation changes dramatically compared to the results in Equation (1). 
After I adjust executive compensation by the cost of living, the location of a firm’s 
headquarters has a positive relation with adjusted total compensation and adjusted 
cash compensation, but still remains negatively related to adjusted equity 
compensation. To be more precise, smaller cities no longer represent lower total 
compensation and cash compensation. When I take the cost of living into 
consideration, companies in smaller cities pay more compensation in total and more 
cash compensation to their senior management. Companies in smaller cities still pay 
less equity compensation to their executives after the adjusting for the cost of living. 
Executives in smaller cities are granted more compensation in total, while less 
compensation in equity. The proportion of equity compensation to the total 
compensation of executives in smaller cities is low. This is consistent with the 
statistics in Table 3 that equity compensation accounts for 13.75% of the 
compensation of executives in smaller cities, while it’s 14.66% of the compensation 
of executives in mega cities. It is also consistent with the previous prediction that 
executives in smaller cities face weaker supervision from shareholders giving them 
greater power to design compensation systems that include more cash, which is more 





Checking for outliers by Studentized Residuals and Cook’s D 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Executives’ Compensation Regression Controlling for Management 
 
In this section, I introduce managerial factors into my model to control for their 
effects on executive compensation. All of the managerial factors include management 
quality (STCK_RETURN), CEOs’ gender (CEO GENDER), founder/controller 
duality (FOUNDER), CEO/Chairman of the Board duality (CEO&CHAIR), 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (LARGEST_SH), shareholding ratio of 
the institutional investors (INSTITUTION), and the number of directors of a company 
(NUM_DIRECTOR). 
 
 （1）  （2） 
 LN (ADJUSTED TOTAL_COM) 
(Studentized Residuals) 








































Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
Observations 4,433  4,216 
R-squared 0.3883  0.4115 
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4.3.1 Controlling for Management Quality 
 
In general, I predict that higher management quality will intuitively increase 
executive compensation. Thus, I add this factor into my model to eliminate its effect. 
Chinese privately-owned enterprises and companies with foreign investors tend to use 
stock returns as a measure of performance (Firth et al. 2006). Bergh and Gibbons 
(2011) find that companies publicly hiring management consultants that are 
considered as the method to improve management quality will achieve higher stock 
returns. Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) and Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay 
(2013) consider historical stock returns as a measure of managerial ability. As such, I 
define management quality as the prior year’s stock returns (STCK_RETURN) rather 
than other common indicators like net profits and EBITDA. STCK_RETURN is the 
stock closed price at the end of the prior year divided by the stock opening price on 
the first trading day of the prior year. Then, I use the following model to conduct the 
regression: 
 
LN(ADJUSTED COMPENSATION) = β0 + β1 * LN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 * AREAS 
+ β3 * ROA + β4 * LEVERAGE + β5 * 
MKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * STCK_RETURN + β7 * EC 
OR NOT + ε                                (3) 
 
Table 7 reports the results for Equation (3). I do not find a significant relationship 
between management quality and adjusted total compensation or adjusted cash 
compensation. For adjusted equity compensation, management quality is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The insignificance of management quality implies that 
Chinese listed Non-SOEs do not pay their executives cash compensation and 
compensation in total based on their management quality. Nonetheless, better 
management quality does not lead to greater equity compensation as expected. The 
data on equity compensation are manually collected from announcements of listed 
companies. I observe all of the announcements of equity and option incentive plans 
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and notice that equity grants are meant to motivate executives in most situations as 
most of these equity and option plans set performance growth targets in advance. That 
is, companies are prone to set up equity incentive plans when they are performing 
poorly to motivate executives to work harder, rather than to set up plans to reward 
executives when they are performing well. I conjecture that the purpose of equity 
issuance is mainly to encourage rather than reward. Meanwhile, the data of equity 
compensation is not the actual amount paid out to executives, but the planned rewards 
to executives due to defects in database and information disclosure of Chinese listed 
companies. This statistic does not reflect the performance after the announcement of 
issuing equity incentives. Hence, it is reasonable that there is a negative relation 
between management quality and equity compensation instead of the previously 
predicted positive relation. 
 
Table 7. 
Controlling for Management Quality 
 （1）  （2）  （3） 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
TOTAL_COM) 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
CASH_COM) 



























































Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
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STCK_RETURN is the stock return of the year before the financial statements. It is equal to the stock closed price at the end of 
the prior year divided by the stock opening price on the first trading day of the prior year.  
For Columns (1) and (2), I use t-statistics to indicate the significance. For Column (3), I use z-statistics as the indicator. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3.2 Controlling for the Characters of Directors and Executives 
 
In this section, I add several variables to control for the effects of the character of 
directors and executives on executive compensation. First, I introduce the gender of 
the CEOs into my model as Chinese female CEOs may earn less compensation than 
Chinese male CEOs (Chen, Ezzamel, and Cai 2011; Lam et al. 2013). Then, I choose 
founder as an independent variable. Founders who are also controllers of companies 
may despise incentive compensation and pay less of it to executives. He (2008) finds 
that founder-CEOs do not pay themselves total compensation and incentive 
compensation as much as professional managers. Thus, I predict that the same person 
who is a founder and a controller of a company will decrease executive compensation. 
Next, I include CEO and chairman duality into the model. When the CEO and the 
chairman is the same person in a firm, the CEO is likely to be less supervised by the 
board and develop a compensation system more favorable to themselves. The number 
of board members works in a similar way. Fewer directors on the board of directors 
will be unable to supervise the executives properly. Therefore, I hypothesize the same 
person serving as both CEO and chairman and smaller boards will increase executive 
compensation. I do not use the number of independent directors in my model as other 
scholars do in their papers because the number of independent directors in China is 
meaningless. CSRS asks listed companies to include at least 33% independent 
directors on their boards. Then, almost every listed companies appoint three 
independent directors to their boards to reach the standard. As a result, this number 
cannot indicate the supervisory effect in China. I run the model below: 
 
LN(ADJUSTED COMPENSATION) = β0 + β1 * LN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 * AREAS 
Observations 4,470  4,470  4,470 
R-squared 0.3829  0.2777   
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+ β3 * ROA + β4 * LEVERAGE + β5 * 
MKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * STCK_RETURN + β7 * CEO 
GENDER + β8 * FOUNDER + β9 * CEO&CHAIR + β10 
* NUM_DIRECTOR + β11 * EC OR NOT + ε      (4) 
 
There are four new variables in total: CEO GENDER, FOUNDER, CEO&CHAIR, 
and NUM_DIRECTOR. CEO GENDER is a dummy variable set equal to one if the 
CEO is a female and zero otherwise. The value of FOUNDER is one when the 
founder is the same as the controller and zero otherwise. CEO&CHAIR is equal to 
one when the CEO is also the chairman of the board of director and zero otherwise. 
NUM_DIRECTORS is the number of directors of a company. 
The Table 8 demonstrates the results of Model (4). I find that the gender of CEOs 
and the duality of CEO/chairman do not have a significant effect on executives’ pay. 
Founder/controller duality and the number of directors have a significant relation with 
executive compensation. However, both do not work as predicted. The same person 
who is both a founder and the controller of a firm will decrease executives’ total and 
cash compensation, while increasing equity compensation. One possible explanation 
for the effect of FOUNDER is that when a founder is also the controller of the firm, 
they often also hold the position of CEO or their successor becomes the CEO. In both 
situations, CEOs do not need to be paid as much as professional managers because it 
is pointless to pay themselves with their own money. Alternatively, they do not need 
money to stimulate themselves to run the business more industriously. However, 
founders hope to maintain their control of the company or gradually hand over control 
to their heirs. Equity compensation can increase their shareholdings to maintain this 
control. They can also use equity compensation to transfer their control to their 
successors. As a result, they prefer equity compensation to cash compensation. As for 
the number of directors, it is positively related to executives’ total and cash 
compensation although slightly. It is at odds with the studies of Firth et al. (2007) and 
Conyon and He (2011). The results of these two studies do not agree with each other. 
The function of the board on executive compensation needs to be further studied. I 
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conjecture that the result is related to the inefficient supervision of boards and the 
relation between board size and company size. Larger boards may lead directors to 
pass the buck. Moreover, larger companies tend to have bigger boards and pay more 
to their executives. Chinese listed companies must have at least seven directors on 
their boards. In my data sample, more than 80% of the companies choose to set 
boards less than or equal to nine. I infer that nine members boards do not exert much 
more pressure on executive compensation than seven members boards despite the fact 
that larger boards can reinforce the monitoring of executives. Since a company must 
have a board with more than nine people, it is prone to be larger and the effect of 
company size may surpass the effect of board size leading to a positive relation 
between board size and executive compensation. Hence, I further replace the 
NUM_DIRECTOR variable with the LARGE_BD variable and rerun the regression. 
 
Table 8. 
Controlling for the Character of Directors and Executives 
 （1）  （2）  （3） 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
TOTAL_COM) 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
CASH_COM) 




































































NUM_DIRECTOR 0.030  0.030  -0.656 
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CEO GENDER is a dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO is a female and zero otherwise. The value of FOUNDER is one 
when the founder is the same as the controller and zero otherwise. CEO&CHAIR is a dummy variable set equal to one if the 
CEO and the Chairman of the Board is the same person and zero otherwise. NUM_DIRECTORS is the number of directors of a 
company. LARGE_BD is a dummy variable set equal to one if the board size is greater than the median and zero otherwise. 
For Columns (1) and (2), I use t-statistics to indicate the significance. For Column (3), I use z-statistics as the indicator. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Because the results of the new regression change very little, and for brevity, I add 
the coefficients of LARGE_BD to the end of the Table 8. I find that LARGE_BD is 
significantly positively related to executive compensation. The results imply that 
companies whose board size is greater than median will pay more to their executives, 
supporting my conjecture. 
 
4.3.3 Executive Compensation Regression Controlling for Ownership 
 
Ownership is also a common factor affecting executive pay. Many Chinese studies 
find that executives of Non-SOEs are paid more than those of SOEs. Considering that 
I have chosen Non-SOEs as my sample data, I introduce the shareholding ratio of the 
largest shareholder (LARGEST_SH) and the proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors (INSTITUTION) into my regression model. 
Large shareholders are a double-edged sword to the agency problem as they have 
greater influence on management to reduce the conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders and, at the same time, as better monitors will impede incentive plans 
(Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997). Bhabra and Hossain (2018) find that large 
[4.7928] *** [5.1335] *** [-1.3976] 





















Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4,470  4,470  4,470 
R-squared 0.3881  0.2837   
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shareholders will exacerbate the agency problem and damage the structure of 
executive compensation. I think equity compensation will erode the control of large 
shareholders, which they do not want. Thus, I predict that LARGEST_SH may 
decrease equity compensation. 
INSTITUTION is a variable representing external supervision. Institutional 
investors have more time and resources to investigate the quality of management and 
limit the power of executives to design their compensation. This monitoring effect can 
mitigate the agency problem (Hartzell and Starks 2003). Zhang and Chung (2018) 
also identify a positive effect of institutional investors on the structure of executive 
compensation. As a result, I predict that INSTITUTION will be negatively related to 
executive compensation. I run the following model: 
 
LN(ADJUSTED COMPENSATION) = β0 + β1 * LN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 * AREAS 
+ β3 * ROA + β4 * LEVERAGE + β5 * 
MKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * STCK_RETURN + β7 * CEO 
GENDER + β8 * FOUNDER + β9 * CEO&CHAIR + β10 
* NUM_DIRECTOR + β11 * LARGEST_SH +β12 * 
INSTITUTION + β13 *EC OR NOT + ε           (5) 
 
Table 9. 
Controlling for Ownership 
 （1）  （2）  （3） 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
TOTAL_COM) 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
CASH_COM) 







































LARGEST_SH represents the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder. INSTITUTION is the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors. 
For Columns (1) and (2), I use t- statistics to indicate the significance. For Column (3), I use z-statistics as the indicator. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9 reports the results of Equation (5). The coefficients of LARGEST_SH and 
INSTITUTION are both inconsistent with my previous predictions. Only the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is mildly negative when related to 
executive’s cash compensation at 5% significance. However, I find no significant 
relation between the LARGEST_SH variable and total or equity compensation. The 
relationship between all kinds of compensation and the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors are all insignificant. Overall, LARGEST_SH and 
INSTITUTION can be said to have no influence on executive compensation. It is 
reasonable and not unforeseen that the previously mentioned double-edged sword 
effect of LARGEST_SH can be offset. What is surprising is that the role of 
































































Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 4,470  4,470  4,470 
R-squared 0.3885  0.2846   
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studies, external supervision, including institutional investors, foreign investors, and 
independent directors, often seems to work well. But Chinese institutional investors 
play no supervisory role in executives’ compensation in Chinese listed Non-SOEs. 
Such a result may imply that we need to rethink the relationship between Chinese 
institutional investors and companies. 
 
4.4 Controlling for Air Quality 
 
Some scholars in the U.S. think that nonmonetary problems like crime rate, 
environmental issues will influence executives’ compensation. Deng and Gao (2013) 
find that high crime rate and high pollution at headquarters locations will increase 
CEOs’ compensation. 
China, in general, is a safe country. The crime rate does not vary much from city to 
city. But the environmental pollution has always been an important issue that cannot 
be overlooked in China. In 2014, the total volume of industrial waste gas emission in 
China was 69,419,000 million cubic meters, the volume of Sulphur dioxide emission 
was 19.744 million tons, and the volume of Nitrogen dioxide emission was 20.78 
million tons. These numbers are all in the top two in the world. Because there are no 
official figures, it is difficult to determine exactly how many foreigners have left 
China due to the pollution. And, I must admit that reports of environmental pollution 
in China do appear regularly in the media. Executives of listed companies are high 
income people and the marginal effect of an income increase on them is relatively low. 
They may be willing to sacrifice some income to work in areas with less pollution to 
obtain a better living environment. The air pollution index is the most popular figure 
to measure environmental pollution. The statistics covers almost all of the regions in 
China and provides almost complete data from 2014-2017. I adopt the index as the 
indicator of environmental pollution. The AIR QUALITY variable is calculated based 
on the average of the air pollution indices for each day of the year. The higher the 
index is, the worse the pollution. I predict that the AIR QUALITY variable is 
significantly positively related to executive compensation. To put it more bluntly, 
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when the air pollution indices decrease, executives will receive less compensation. I 
use the model below to estimate the effect of AIR QUALITY: 
 
LN(ADJUSTED COMPENSATION) = β0 + β1 * LN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 * AREAS 
+ β3 * ROA + β4 * LEVERAGE + β5 * 
MKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * STCK_RETURN + β7 * CEO 
GENDER + β8 * FOUNDER + β9 * CEO&CHAIR + β10 
* NUM_DIRECTOR + β11 * LARGEST_SH +β12 * 
INSTITUTION + β13 * AIR QUALITY + β14 * EC OR 
NOT + ε                                    (6) 
 
Table 10 reports the results of Equation (6). Once again, the result is contrary to my 
expectations. I find that air quality is negatively related to total compensation and 
cash compensation. As pollution rises, executives’ pay also falls. I put the data of 
unadjusted compensation into the model and achieve the same results. For the sake of 
brevity, I only report the results of adjusted compensation. Chinese executives do not 
choose enterprises in smaller cities for a better living environment. This is probably 
not because Chinese executives don't care about pollution. Table 2 provides the 
average air pollution indices for smaller cities and mega cities. I find that the air 
pollution index is 84.578 in smaller cities and 87.050 in mega cities. The gap between 
the two kinds of cites is about 3%, which is small enough to be ignored. Overall, I 
believe that working in smaller cities will not improve an executive’s living 
environment. In addition, Chinese people and the government now place high a 
priority on economic development. People and the governments of poor areas are very  
 
Table 10. 
Controlling for Air Quality 
 （1）  （2）  （3） 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
TOTAL_COM) 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
CASH_COM) 
 LN (ADJUSTED 
EQUITY_COM+1) 
LOG(TOTAL_REV) 0.224  0.228  2.286 
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AIR QUALITY is calculated based on the average of the air pollution indices for each day of the year. 
For Columns (1) and (2), I use t- statistics to indicate the significance. For Column (3), I use z-statistics as the indicator. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
likely to sacrifice the environment for economic development. This, in turn, can lead 
to more serious pollution problems in economically underdeveloped areas than in 
mega cities. According to the 2016 national air quality situation released by the 
Chinese ministry of environmental protection, the ten cities with the worst air quality 
are all in smaller cities. Thus, the negative coefficient of AIR QUALITY does not 
























































































Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,576  3,576  3,576 
R-squared 0.3876  0.2838   
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indicate that Chinese executives are willing to work in mega cities and suffer more 
environmental pollution. The result is that Chinese executives earn less in 
economically underdeveloped regions and suffer more from pollution by doing so. 
 
4.5 Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 
Pay-for-performance sensitivity is also an important criterion to measure the 
structure of executive compensation. It allows us to intuitively see the difference in 
executives’ compensation between mega cities and smaller cities. The analysis above 
helps us to identify which factors contribute to executive compensation. However, we 
cannot measure the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance by the amount only. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that a proper 
compensation system is more important than the amount of compensation. When the 
company's compensation system becomes more reasonable, the money they pay to 
their executives will have stronger incentives and constraints. In my sample data, 
companies in mega cities pay more to their executives than companies in smaller 
cities. It does not mean that executives in mega cities are overpaid. Similarly, after I 
adjust the compensation by the cost of living index, executives in mega cities are paid 
less by their companies than executives in smaller cities. It does not suggest that 
executives in mega cities are underpaid. I introduce pay-for-performance sensitivity 
as an indicator of the incentive effects of compensation on executives as in previous 
studies. I follow Bhabra and Hossain (2018) in defining pay-for-performance 
sensitivity as the changes in the top three executives’ compensation of each company 
divided by the corresponding changes in shareholder wealth. The changes in the top 
three executives’ compensation include changes in total compensation, changes in 
cash compensation, and changes in equity compensation. Since the investors of listed 
companies are not necessarily primarily local, I do not adjust shareholders’ wealth by 
the cost of living index. However, the cost of living index is still an important variable. 
I use both the compensation data that is not adjusted by the cost of living index and 
data that is adjusted by the cost of living index to conduct my regression. The model 
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of the regression on pay-for-performance sensitivity is displayed as follows: 
 
LN(PAY_PERFORMANCE_SENSITIVITY) = β0 + β1 * ΔLN(TOTAL_REV) + β2 
* AREAS + β3 * ΔROA + β4 * ΔLEVERAGE + β5 * 
ΔMKT-TO-BOOK + β6 * ΔMKT-VALUE + β7 * 
ΔSTCK_RETURN + β8 * THE-EQUITY-RATIO + β9 * 
CEO GENDER + β10 * FOUNDER + β11 * 
CEO&CHAIR + β12 * NUM_DIRECTOR + β13 * 
LARGEST_SH +β14 * INSTITUTION + ε         (7) 
 
LN(PAY_PERFORMANCE_SENSITIVITY) is the natural log of 
pay-for-performance sensitivity including total compensation performance sensitivity 
(TCPS), cash compensation performance sensitivity (CCPS), and equity 
compensation performance sensitivity (ECPS). I use the nominal change in 
compensation to calculate the nominal pay-for-performance sensitivity. I also adjust 
the nominal change in compensation by the cost of living index to calculate the 
adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity. I define nominal pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity as the dependent variable and 
conduct the regressions, respectively. ΔLN(TOTAL_REV) is the change in the natural 
log of total operating revenue for each company between this year and last year. 
ΔROA represents the change in ROA between this year and last year. ΔLEVERAGE 
is the change in LEVERAGE. ΔMKT-TO-BOOK is the change in MKT-TO-BOOK 
between this year and last year. ΔMKT-VALUE is the 1,000,000 RMB change in the 
market value. ΔSTCK_RETURN is defined as the change in STCK_RETURN. 
THE-EQUITY-RATIO represents the ratio of equity compensation to total 
compensation. 
In this model, I only select the samples whose pay-performance sensitivity is 
non-negative. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) find that if CEOs gain $100 when 
companies perform well, they will only lose $55-$75 when companies perform poorly. 
This result implies that pay-performance sensitivity may be dysfunctional when 
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business declines. Moreover, when a business performs badly, companies tend to 
dismiss executives rather than decrease their compensation (Conyon and He 2008; 
Garvey and Milbourn 2006). As a result, I adopt non-negative TCPS, CCPS, and 
ECPS only to ensure that pay-performance sensitivity works well as a gauge of the 
incentive effects of compensation. Because equity compensation is not common in 
China, major statistics of equity compensation are zero in my samples. The change in 
ECPS equaling zero does not represent anything meaningful. I further delete samples 
whose equity compensation values zero in my regression. I use a Tobit model to 
conduct regression on TCPS and CCPS as they cannot be less than zero. I add one to 
TCPS and CCPS to ensure that the natural log of TCPS and CCPS always makes 
sense. 
Table 11 reports the coefficients of the independent variables and their significance. 
Because the results of the regressions on adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity do 
not show a significant difference in the factors on which I focus most in this paper, I 
only provide the results of the regressions on nominal pay-for-performance sensitivity 
for brevity. In the table, I find some expected results. ΔLOG(TOTAL_REV) is 
negatively related to pay-performance sensitivity in all models, and ΔROA is also 
correlated with TCPS and CCPS. These results are consistent with previous studies 
(Lippert and Porter 1997; Conyon and He 2011; Bhabra and Hossain 2018). The 
positive effect of the change in the market-to-book ratio (ΔMKT-TO-BOOK) and 
stock returns (STCK_RETURN) reinforce that companies with better stock market 
performance are willing to pay more to their executives. This is also consistent with 
the results above. 
 
Table 11. 
Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity Regression 
 （1）  （2）  （3） 







AREAS -0.113  -0.106  -0.211 
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LN (TCPS+1), LN (CCPS+1), and LN (ECPS) represent the natural log of total compensation performance sensitivity, cash 
compensation performance sensitivity, and equity compensation performance sensitivity, respectively. ΔLN(TOTAL_REV) is the 
change in the natural log of total operating revenue for each company between this year and last year. AREAS is a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the headquarters of company is located in a smaller city and zero otherwise. ΔROA represents the 
change in ROA between this year and last year, and ROA is equal to EBITDA divided by total assets. ΔLEVERAGE is the 
change in LEVERAGE, and LEVERAGE is long-term debt divided by total assets. ΔMKT-TO-BOOK is the change in 
MKT-TO-BOOK between this year and last year, and MKT-TO-BOOK is the market value divided by the book value. 
ΔMKT-VALUE is the 1,000,000 RMB change in market value. ΔSTCK_RETURN is defined as the change of STCK_RETURN, 
and STCK_RETURN is the stock closed price at the end of the prior year divided by the stock opening price on the first trading 
day of the prior year. THE-EQUITY-RATIO represents the ratio of equity compensation to total compensation. CEO GENDER 
is a dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO is a female and zero otherwise. The value of FOUNDER is one when the 
founder is the same as the controller and zero otherwise. CEO&CHAIR is a dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO and the 
Chairman of the Board is the same person and zero otherwise. NUM_DIRECTORS is the number of directors of a company. 

















































































Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,160  2,285  318 
R-squared -  -  0.4115 
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LARGEST_SH represents the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder. INSTITUTION is the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors. 
For Columns (1) and (2), I use z-statistics as the indicator. For Column (3), I use t-statistics as the indicator. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
As for my core concerns, it is obvious that executives in smaller cities demonstrate 
lower total compensation performance sensitivity and cash compensation performance 
sensitivity than their counterparts in mega cities. This result suggests that 
compensation of executives in smaller cities has less incentive and restriction effects, 
and the contract between the agent and the owner is less effective. It is consistent with 
my expectation that executives in smaller cities have more influence over their pay, 
both in terms of structure and amount. But the negative effect of smaller cities on 
pay-performance sensitivity is not irreducible. In Columns (1) and (3), I find that the 
EQUITY RATIO variable is positively correlated to TCPS, and ECPS is not 
significantly related to the AREAS variable. I can infer that equity compensation is an 
effective incentive to increase pay-performance sensitivity. This also confirms 
previous studies that equity incentive plans are better suited to connect the interests of 
shareholders and executives. What is more important is that this compensation is not 
subject to regional differences. There is not enough evidence to suggest that 
executives in smaller cities are less motivated than executives in mega cities when 
they receive equity compensation. This phenomenon brings enlightenment to the 
design of the executive compensation system of Chinese listed Non-SOEs in smaller 
cities. Listed enterprises in smaller cities can introduce more equity incentives and 
improve the proportion of equity compensation in the total compensation to address 
the issue where pay-for-performance sensitivity is lower than that of companies in 
mega cities. 
The coefficients of NUM_DIRECTOR and INSTITUTION are also noteworthy. In 
the study in Part 4, I find that the number of directors and the proportion of shares 
held by institutional investors do not show the correlation to compensation as 
expected. In this model, they are still not correlated to pay-for-performance sensitivity 
as expected. Both NUM_DIRECTOR and INSTITUTION are significantly negatively 
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correlated to all kinds of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Directors and institutional 
investors both play the role of a supervisor in prevailing wisdom. But in Chinese 
listed Non-SOEs, they not only fail to monitor executives, but also intensify the 
agency costs between the agent and the shareholders. 
In regard to the effect of board size, the main problems may lie in the following 
aspects. First, the effect of board size may be exceeded by the effect of company size. 
Large companies tend to have larger boards, but they also tend to decrease 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. The effects of company size and board size 
counteract and make the size of the board appear negative to pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. In addition, the system of boards of directors has a short history in China. 
The boards of Chinese listed companies do not oversee the management efficiently 
(Hu, Tam, and Tan 2010). When the boards of Chinese listed companies get larger, 
free riding becomes more serious. These two views may possibly be the reason behind 
the dysfunction of the board. 
For the negative effect of invalidation of institutional investors, I infer that 
institutional investors have not done their duty of supervision. It is consistent with the 
result of Aggarwal, Hu, and Yang (2013) that insurance companies and pension funds 
do not monitor listed companies effectively. Chinese institutional investors have a 
long way to go until they can play the role of their peers in developed markets. They 
are even younger than the Chinese stock market which is only about 30 years old. 
Institutional investors account for an extremely small proportion of the total number 
of accounts opened. The outstanding market value held by institutional investors, 
although growing rapidly, is still less than 40% as of 2018. It may take some time for 
this growing industry to play its part in Chinese listed companies. Also due to the 
youth of the capital market and the lack of a delisting system, I suspect that 
institutional investors may encounter similar problems with loan discrimination in 
Chinese banks. Lending to state-owned enterprises is less risky than to private ones 
thanks to government support (Lu, Zhu, and Zhang 2012). Similarly, institutional 
investors may know of the problems of listed companies and still choose to inject 
funds. Institutional investors do not have enough investing targets and the possibility 
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of delisting of listed companies is almost nonexistent in China leading to lower risks 
of investment. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
 
I use the alternative definition or measure of several variables to conduct my 
robustness tests. 
 
5.1 Alternative Definition of LEVERAGE 
 
In the previous models, I calculated the LEVERAGE variable as long-term debt 
divided by total assets. Here, I define the total debt divided by shareholders equity as 
the LEVERAGE variable. Although the new LEVERAGE variable is no longer 
significantly related to executive compensation, the coefficients of rest of the 
variables stay almost the same. 
 
5.2 Alternative Measure for Compensation 
 
In the models above, I collect the top three executives’ cash compensation as the 
Cash Compensation variable. I collect their equity compensation as the Equity 
Compensation variable and calculate the Total Compensation variable by adding cash 
compensation and equity compensation. CEOs’ compensation is also widely used by 
researchers. Here, I alter the variables to CEOs’ compensation. I collect CEOs’ cash 
compensation as the new Cash Compensation variable. I also collect CEO’s equity 
compensation to calculate the CEOs’ total compensation as the new Total 
Compensation variable. Because the number of non-zero equity compensation of the 
CEOS is too small, I cannot obtain a reliable coefficient for it. Therefore, I only use 
Total Compensation and Cash Compensation in this robustness test. 
The results of the test are presented in Table 12. I find that geographic location still 
plays an important role in CEO compensation and the relationship between the 
53 
location and the compensation is similar to the results in Table 9. As a result, the core 
findings of my study remain the same. 
 
Table 12. 
Alternative Measure for Compensation 
LN (ADJUSTED CEO_COM) and LN (ADJUSTED CEO_CASH_COM) are the natural log of adjusted CEOs’ total 
compensation and cash compensation, respectively. 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 （1）  （2） 



































































Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
Observations 4,470  4,470 




A number of studies have shown that enterprises in smaller cities are more prone to 
information asymmetry leading to fierce conflict between agents and shareholders. 
Executives’ compensation is one of the means to fix this agency problem. In this 
paper, I use the data of Chinese listed Non-SOEs from 2013-2017 to examine whether 
Chinese executives in smaller cities use information asymmetry to design 
compensation more favorable for themselves and, if so, whether there is a way to 
reduce the negative effect of smaller cites on the compensation design. I conduct my 
study on both cash compensation and equity compensation. My results demonstrate 
that executives in smaller cities earn more money and a higher proportion of cash 
compensation after I adjust for the effect of the cost of living. Further, I control other 
factors influencing executive compensation, like total revenue of companies, return on 
assets, leverage, the market value to book value ratio, stock returns, CEO’s gender, 
duality of the founder and controller, duality of the CEO and chairman, board size, the 
proportion held by largest shareholders and institutional investors, and air quality. The 
conclusions remain the same. Moreover, I investigate the role of geographic location 
on pay-for-performance sensitivity and find that total compensation and cash 
compensation of executives in smaller cities has lower pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. This suggests that companies in smaller cities provide fewer incentives for 
their executives. It also implies that cash compensation, which is regularly paid to 
executives, has also been heavily interfered with by executives. 
In addition to the two main findings above, I also find that board size and the 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors do not work as they do in 
developed countries and markets. Directors and institutional investors act as 
supervisors of publicly traded companies and usually their supervision has been found 
effective in previous studies. However, in Chinese listed Non-SOEs, they lose their 
magic. They fail to make a difference, both in terms of compensation and 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. Not only do they fail to significantly alleviate the 
influence of executives in smaller cities on the compensation system, they exacerbate 
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the problem. 
The results above may have some implications for corporate governance in China. 
Executives in smaller cities exert more power on compensation design to benefit 
themselves than executives in mega cities. Enterprises in smaller cities need to take 
greater action to remedy this issue. In addition, enterprises in smaller cities can 
increase the proportion of equity compensation to improve the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of their compensation efficiently. Moreover, enterprises should seek to 
improve the supervisory capacity of the board of directors rather than simply increase 
the number of members. The introduction of more directors cannot improve the 
management quality. I also suggest that enterprises should not treat institutional 
investors as an effective supervisor. Higher institutional investors’ shareholdings will 
not improve the level of supervision over management. In contrast, it will decrease 
the level of supervision. 
There are several potential limitations in my paper. First, I define equity 
compensation as the value of equity incentives announced to be granted to executives. 
It is calculated based on the Black-Scholes Model. This definition elicits two 
problems. Executives may not have received the equity compensation after the 
announcement. Enterprises can cancel their equity incentive plans for many reasons. 
Alternatively, these plans usually set goals in advance. Once executives do not reach 
the goal, they will not be rewarded. In addition, the Black-Scholes Model calculates 
the value of European options. But equity incentives are not the same as European 
options. Executives do not have to exercise the options on a certain day. As a result, 
the power of equity compensation and the related results in my paper is limited. 
Additionally, equity compensation is becoming more common in China. Even the 
government has encouraged SOEs to grant equity incentives to executives since 2018. 
In the future, the study of the relationship between equity compensation and 
performance in the Chinese market can be done more comprehensively and 
completely based on more detailed statistics on executive compensation. 
My paper is one of the first to include geographic location as a factor in executive 
compensation in China. I have preliminarily confirmed the importance of this factor 
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for corporate governance. I hope further studies on this topic can pay greater attention 
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